



Insights from SHOT: Errors reported where transfusion specific requirements were not met

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






Transfusion specific requirements

Blood components




Blood administration





What are the main transfusion specific requirements that we need to be aware of?





Risks when these specific transfusion requirements are not met

1 Irradiation

Potential risk of transfusion-associated graft versus host disease

2 Ag-negative

Maternal sensitisation leading to HDFN or HTR

Phenotypematched

Sensitisation, HTR, poor Hb increments, 个个 transfusions

4 CMV negative

CMV infection in the recipient or fetus

5) IgA def

Allergic anaphylactic reactions 6 HLA/HPAmatched

Poor platelet increments and risk of bleeding

Blood warmer

Destruction of transfused red cells





Definitions of current SHOT reporting categories & what to report




Revised February 2021



ADVERSE EVENTS					
TERM	DEFINITION	WHAT TO REPORT			
IBCT – SRNM (Incorrect Blood Component Transfused – Specific Requirements Not Met)	Where a patient was transfused with a blood component that did not meet their specific transfusion requirements. Do NOT report if a clinical decision has been taken to knowingly transfuse components not meeting specification in view of clinical urgency. N.B. Occurrences where pathogen inactivated plasma components or apheresis platelets are not supplied for those born after 1996 or with TTP are no longer SHOT reportable. SaBTO (the advisory committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues and Organs), review on this matter can be found here.	Transfusion of a blood component of inappropriate specification or that did not meet the patient's individual requirements Examples currently include failure to transfuse: Cytomegalovirus (CMV)-negative components Irradiated components Human leucocyte antigen (HLA)-matched platelets Antigen-negative red cells for patients with known irregular red cell antibodies Incorrect specification of component transfused to patient as a result of incorrect sex/gender allocation (e.g., K negative not provided) Red cells of correct phenotype in accordance with national guidelines e.g., haemoglobinopathy, patients with childbearing potential Also: Testing or release of components when the status of the sample does not comply with the guidelines Release of components prior to completion of laboratory testing (including internal quality control) Failure to use blood warmer when clinically indicated Inappropriate use of electronic issue			

Trends in SRNM error reports submitted to SHOT 1996-2020



IBCT-SRNM errors reported to SHOT 2016-2020







IBCT-SRNM errors reported to SHOT 2016-2020

Distribution of errors

Most clinical errors are failure to request irradiated or CMV screened blood components and most laboratory errors are failure to complete testing prior to issue, inappropriate use of electronic issue or providing the incorrect phenotype.

Impact on patient safety

No deaths occurred due to IBCT-SRNM during this period, but 12 cases of major morbidity were directly caused by these errors with 11 cases of sensitisation to K-antigen, and one case of haemolytic transfusion reaction.







Communication failures

between clinical areas

including shared care, or

between clinical and laboratory

areas were stated as a

contributory factor in **39.4%**

(459/1169) of reports.

This reiterates the **importance**

of good communication links

between all areas involved

with patient care as outlined

by SHOT 2020

recommendations.













CLINICAL ERRORS







- Failure to request CMV screened (8.1%)
- Poor communication between clinical area and laboratory
- Missed opportunities to detect error at patient bedside

LABORATORY ERRORS






- Failure to complete testing prior to issue (5.3%)
- Inappropriate electronic issue of red cells (8.9%)
- Providing incorrect phenotype for red cells (9.7%)
- Failure to heed information on request forms
- Overriding IT alerts due to alert fatigue







Illustrative cases reported to SHOT



Case 1: Failure to consult available historical records in a patient with sickle cell disease prior to exchange transfusion (1/2)

- A woman was under shared care between two different hospitals
- She required specialist surgery at another centre which was not her usual base
- She had a history of anti-S, anti-E, anti-Fy^a, anti-Fy^b and anti-Fy3
- She had been transfused with appropriate phenotype, and the antibodies were not detectable from 2013
- She underwent preoperative exchange transfusion at the specialist centre with eight units
- Neither her base hospital transfusion laboratory records nor Sp-ICE data were accessed for her antibody history



Case 1: Failure to consult available historical records in a patient with sickle cell disease prior to exchange transfusion (1/2)

 Four days later she presented to her own hospital unwell with haemoglobinuria and was initially thought to be in sickle crisis

 However this was a delayed haemolytic transfusion reaction associated with anti-Fy^a and anti-Fy3 (identified in the eluate)

She made a full recovery



Learning points

PATIENTS WITH SICKLE HAEMOGLOBINOPATHIES SHOT STOP, DISEASE AND CONSIDER THALASSAEMIA HAVE SPECIFIC DECIDE, BEFORE TRANSFUSING **Serious Hazards** REQUIREMENTS FOR of Transfusion different ABID cards



Case 2: Non-irradiated platelet units issued to a <10-year-old patient despite a warning flag, 3 errors (1/2)



A BMS issued two bags of platelets for a patient who required irradiated cellular components



This specific patient requirement was recorded on the LIMS. BMS 2 was covering for a break during a night shift, and receipted the platelets on arrival from the Blood Service



When BMS 1 returned from their break, they received a handover message that the platelets had been placed on the agitator but required irradiation. This message was taken verbally but not written down



It is usual practice at this hospital for all platelets to be irradiated on arrival from the Blood Service and then placed on the agitator, however in this instance that did not happen

Case 2: Non-irradiated platelet units issued to a <10-year-old patient despite a warning flag, 3 errors (2/2)



The shift ended and day staff arrived. BMS 3 issued the platelets assuming they had been irradiated



A message flagged up that they had not been irradiated but was overridden



At administration BloodTrack® was used but it did not pick up the need for irradiated platelets, and it was not picked up by the registered nurse administering them and so the patient received the transfusion



The error was noticed during the bedside check for the second unit

The unit was returned to the laboratory and an incident form completed

Structured handovers for safe transfusions

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Safe handovers: Safe patients-why good quality structured handovers in the transfusion laboratory are important

First published: 02 March 2022 | https://doi.org/10.1111/tme.12853

Funding information: Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; University Hospitals of Derby; Burton NHS Foundation Trust

Read the full text >









Background

Effective transfer of information relating to patient care is vital in healthcare. In the UK formal handover is an established and well reported process in the clinical setting but less so in transfusion laboratories. Blood transfusions occur within many hospital specialities and across clinical and laboratory staff shifts, making robust handover critical






Key principles for safe handovers

- O Who should be involved?
- O When should it take place?
- Owhere should it occur?
- O How should it happen?
- O What needs to be handed over?
- Does the handover capture if tasks have been appropriately actioned?
- Are procedures for escalation clearly outlined?
- Have cognitive biases been considered in handover design?

Looking at IT errors over time

IT-related errors - reported 2016-2019



https://www.shotuk.org/wp-content/uploads/myimages/SHOT-Bite-No.-13-IT.pdf

IT-related error	Number of errors
Failure to use flags and/or logic rules	217
Warning flag not updated	119
Warning flag in place but not heeded	109
Equipment failure	93
Failure to consult or identify historical record	84
Errors related to electronic blood management systems	72
Incorrect result/data entered/accessed manually	67
Anti-D related	56
Computer or other IT systems failure	49
Failure to link, merge or reconcile computer records	36
Discrepancy between LIMS and PAS	36
Blood issued against wrong patient ID (sample or request form)	36
Miscellaneous	29
Total	1003



Reducing 'Alert fatigue'



1. Regularly review and reduce redundant alerts



2. Make all alerts contextual and actionable



3. Ensure appropriate escalation and timely actions



4. Apply human factors principles when designing alerts e.g. tiered alerts



5. Improve safety culture by creating a shared sense of responsibility between laboratory and IT dept

https://www.shotuk.org/resources/current-resources/shot-bites/



Case 3: Failure to provide irradiated blood components

 Patient was for a peripheral blood stem cell transplant that had previously been cancelled. The patient's notes had been updated

 Request form stated that IRRADIATED blood was required and that the patient was pre- transplant

 Blood was serologically cross matched and sent to the ward. When the ward staff were checking the unit, it was noticed that the unit was NOT irradiated (Lab error)







Safe transfusions in haemopoietic stem cell transplant recipients



The Royal College of Pathologists fusion Pathology: the science behind the cure BSBMTCT
BETTO SOCIETY OF
BLOOD AND MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION
TRANSPLANTATION

tional Blood Transfusion Committee

The following checklist has been created to reduce errors and optimise safety of transfusions in autologous and allogeneic haemopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) recipients and should be used by the transplant centre team as part of every transplant recipient's journey. The blood group changes are only applicable to allogeneic stem cell transplants where ABO and/or D groups are different. This document should be used in conjunction with local policies relating to provision of blood components for HSCT.


Key action point for all HSCT centres: Design a process to incorporate this checklist into your local policy with a procedure describing how to use/ follow it.

The checklist below is based on the emerging themes and weak points identified from the error reports submitted to SHOT and has been approved by the Transfusion Medicine Specialty Advisory Committee of the Royal College of Pathologists, the National Blood Transfusion Committee, the British Society of Blood and Marrow Transplantation & Cellular Therapy, the SHOT Steering Group and the SHOT Working Expert Group. The actions in the checklist below have been grouped according to phases of the patient's transplant journey.

	tions at the transplant centre for every transplant recipient	
Pre	e-transplant admission	
1	Is a representative from the hospital transfusion team (scientist, clinician, or transfusion practitioner) available to support the transplant planning meetings if advice is needed?	Y/N
2	Does the transplant protocol clearly identify all centres involved in the care of the patient?	Y/N
3	Does the transplant team have the contact details for shared care/referral centre and other teams involved?	Y/N
4	Have samples been taken from both donor and recipient and tested for ABO and D groups, antibody screen, anti-A and anti-B titres by Indirect Antiglobulin Test (IAT) where indicated and direct antiglobulin test (DAT)?	Y/N
5	Are all the transfusion specifications (e.g. donor and recipient blood groups in different phases of the transplant and all specific requirements) clearly identified on the transplant protocol?	Y/N
6	Has the copy of the transplant protocol been sent to the transfusion laboratory at transplant centre?	Y/N
7	Has the clinical team received confirmation that the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS)	Y/N



Safe and effective communications – the 7 Cs






GET IT RIGHT FIRST TIME EVERY TIME




HAVE YOU COMPLETED
THE CHECKLIST BEFORE
STARTING THE BLOOD
TRANSFUSION?







Learning from Near Misses





Near Misses

Near Misses may occur many times before an actual harmful incident

Organisational culture

A learning, resilient, high reliability organisation will endeavour to learn from near miss incidents

NM as learning opportunities

NM represent error-prone situations and have been picked up by vigilant staff and processes. These also need to be investigated thoroughly to help build robust systems and prevent real events

Safety is everyone's responsibility

Raising awareness, improving patient/donor education and involving donors/patients in decision making and checks where possible is vital




Near misses IBCT-SRNM cases reported in 2020



Overview

• There were 19 clinical SRNM and 48 laboratory SRNM near miss cases reported in 2020




Clinical

• 15/19 (78.9%) – patients could have received non-irradiated blood components and 13/15 of these errors were made at the request stage




Laboratory

- Mainly at the component selection step. Most NM IBCT-SRNM were detected at the preadministration bedside check 26/48 (54.2%). In others the error was detected by chance.
- Most cases involved patients requiring irradiated blood, 25/48 (52.1%).





Ten steps in transfusion



Chapter 4 2020 SHOT Report








Safe Transfusion Practice: Transfusion Checklist

	Transfusion Requ	est		Signature to
Ensure that:				confirm
	n is documented in the patient rec	2000	77 C 20 May 20	
Details on the transfusion requirements documents	authorisation (prescription) sheet ed	are completed and any	/ specific	
All fields on the transfusi	on request form are completed and	the form is signed		
patient's bedside. These	e transfusion sample are complete must be handwritten unless electro le from the patient ID band are ava	onic systems are availab		
transfusion, and this is do In cases where the patier	re appropriate family/carers have) cumented Or It is unconscious and/or unable to ensure this is documented in the p	consent and the blood	component is given	
The laboratory is informe	d of the degree of urgency of the r	equest		
	Pre-Tran	sfusion Checks		
Ensure that				
There is adequate and sa venous access device	tisfactory venous access: establish	or verify patency of per	ipheral or central	
undertaken whenever po	risk assessment for transfusion-ass ssible (especially if older than 50 y			
50kg), and appropriate pr				
The blood component is	The state of the s	ollection		
Ensure that:	C	nection		
	e patient identity details is correct	and matches the detail	ls on the unit	T .
	ponent as per the prescription or a		a on the unit	
	equirements that are documented		authorisation	k
	matches or is compatible with the		iutionsacion	
	n good condition (i.e. no leaks/clot			
	person trained and competency a		ion	
	was removed from temperature co			
Cimical area are both rec		ninistration		l.
Ensure that:				
Pre-transfusion observati	ons are taken and recorded within	60 before commencem	nent	
Temperature		Blood pressure		
Pulse		Respiration rate		-90
Documentation for the tr	ansfusion record is complete and a	eccurate	1.	
The unit has the special re	equirements that are documented	on the prescription or a	authorisation	
You have the correct com	ponent as per the prescription or a	authorisation		
The patient blood group	matches or is compatible with the	group of the unit		
The correct blood transfu	sion administration set is used, (an	nd a fresh set if transfus	ing platelets)	
	fication checks are performed at the npatibility label. Confirm identity works			
A blood warmer or infusion	on device (if used) is set correctly a	nd monitored		
Observations are carried	out, as a minimum at 15 minutes		(V.	70.
Temperature		Blood pressure		
Pulse		Respiration rate		
Any adverse events/com	olications are reported to the respondent	onsible clinician and the	transfusion	
	diately acted upon and documents	ed in the patient record	and reported	
The finish time of the tra	sfusion is documented	7-11-1		
The transfusion is comple (Note that once thawed,	eted within 4 hours of removal fron FFP should be transfused as soon a ours if stored at 20–24 °C or within	s possible. If delay is und	avoidable, FFP	

Cryoprecipitate, once thawed has to be kept at room temp and used within 4 hours)

Pre-administration patient side safety checks






Safe Transfusion Practice: Transfusion Checklist

Ensure that:	Post Transfusion	Signature to confirm
Post-transfusion observations are take	en and recorded	
Temperature	Blood pressure	
Pulse	Respiration rate	170
as per local policy	d is completed and correctly returned or scanned electron	nically as,
The component pack and other equip		
The outcome of the transfusion is doc	umented in the patient record	
A post-transfusion information sheet general	given to the patient (if a day-case or received the transfus	sion in an

The A-E Decision Tree to facilitate decision making in transfusion



Transfusion process (nine steps)



The NHSBT Patient Blood Management team and SHOT have coproduced a 'Pre-transfusion blood sampling' animated video and another outlining critical steps for completing 'Preadministration bedside checks of blood components'. These can be found here: https://www.shotuk.org/resources/current- This checklist has been updated in June 2020 and provides a structured process to ensure that the right component is transfused to the right patient at the right time for the right reason and will help ensure patients have received the right information about their transfusion in a timely manner where possible. There is a lack of unequivocal evidence to support either a one- or two-person checking procedure. There is no evidence from SHOT reports (Bolton-Maggs, 2015) to suggest that two-person checking is safer than one. If local policy requires a two-person checking procedure, each person should complete all the checks independently (double independent checking). The checklist will help improve transfusion safety and is a requirement following the CMO CAS alert sent out in November 2017:
CEM/CMO/2017/005 and can be found at this link:

https://www.cas.mhra.gov.uk/ViewandAcknowledgment/View ert.aspx?AlertID=102663. We encourage users to utilise this document to help draft checklists locally.





Administration					
Ensure that:					
Pre-transfusion observations are taken and recorded within 60 before commencement					
Temperature		Blood pressure			
Pulse		Respiration rate			
Documentation for the trans	fusion record is complete and a	ccurate			
The unit has the special requ	irements that are documented o	on the prescription or a	uthorisation		
You have the correct compo	nent as per the prescription or a	uthorisation			
The patient blood group mat	The patient blood group matches or is compatible with the group of the unit				
The correct blood transfusion administration set is used, (and a fresh set if transfusing platelets)					
Pre-administration identification checks are performed at the bedside, including a check of the identity					
band against the unit compatibility label. Confirm identity verification with the patient where possible,					
using open ended questions					
A blood warmer or infusion o	device (if used) is set correctly ar	nd monitored			
Observations are carried out	, as a minimum at 15 minutes				
Temperature		Blood pressure			
Pulse		Respiration rate			
Any adverse events/complication	ations are reported to the respo	nsible clinician and the	transfusion		
laboratory, and are immedia	tely acted upon and documente	d in the patient record	and reported		
The finish time of the transfu	usion is documented				
The transfusion is completed	within 4 hours of removal from	temperature-controlle	ed storage		
(Note that once thawed, FFP	should be transfused as soon as	possible. If delay is und	avoidable, FFP		
should be used within 4 hour	rs if stored at 20–24 °C or within	24 hours if stored at 2-	-6 ℃.		
Cryoprecipitate, once thawed	d has to be kept at room temp a	nd used within 4 hours)			





NHS Blood and Transplant

FACTSHEET

Cytomegalovirus (CMV) Negative Blood Components Information for Healthcare Professional

Information for patients reeding irradiated blood

`t information

What is Cytomegalovirus?

Cytomegalovirus (CMV) is a type of herpes virus. Primary infection is usually asymptomatic but may cause a flu or glandular fever like illness, leading to a lifelong infection in all age groups. The virus can reactivate from its latent state and it is commonly shed asymptomatically in various bodily secretions, such as nasopharyngeal secretions and urine. More severe disease may occur in individuals with impaired immunity such as foetuses, neonates and patients of any age who have been immuno-suppressed by disease or treatment.


How are people exposed to CMV?

Infection frequently occurs in childhood and in the UK it is estimated that

50-60% of adults are CMV positive. As CMV is very common, most adults will have been infected earlier in life and will have developed an immune.



Trnasfusion safety



Consenting patients prior to transfusions (based on the SaBTO guidance and NICE guidance NG24)

Key aspects to be covered when consenting patients for transfusion

- Patient and/or family/carer have been provided with relevant information about blood transfusions that would help in their decision-making process
- 2 The reason for the transfusion has been discussed
- 3 The benefits of the transfusion have been explained
- Transfusion risks, both short and long-term risks have been discussed with the patient and/or family/carer (including any additional risks pertinent to long term multi-transfused patients)
- 5 The risks, benefits, and consequences of NOT accepting blood transfusion have been elaborated
- 6 Transfusion issues specific to the patient have been highlighted
- Relevant alternative options have been discussed including how they might reduce the need for a transfusion
- 9 The transfusion process has been explained
- The need for any specific requirements for blood components and rationale, including need for anti-D lg post transfusion as appropriate has been elaborated and relevant patient information leaflet has been provided
- Patient and/or family/carer has also been informed that once transfused, they are no longer eligible to donate blood
- 12 Patients and carers/family have been given the opportunity and been encouraged to ask questions
- Patient and/or family/carer is aware that if they change their mind at any point before the transfusion, they are entitled to withdraw their consent, and this should be documented and managed appropriately
- 14 Synopsis of discussions and decisions taken documented in patient's clinical notes



Conclusions and recommendations





Staff awareness through education and training



Communication — clear, accurate, timely all along the transfusion pathway



Laboratory and IT Safety: LIMS algorithms, addressing alert fatigue



Patient education and empowerment





Suggestions for service improvement projects

Are we meeting the transfusion specific requirements for all our patients?

Check the process end to end and see how these are managed in your organisation

Patient consent audit

Pre-transfusion safety checks- are they BAU? How effective are these checks?

Number of cases of missed irradiation in the preceding 6 months, thematic analysis with CAPA

Communications including transfusion requests and discharge summaries



Safety is a team effort. Communication, collaboration and coordination amongst all healthcare professionals involved in the patient care (both clinical and laboratory) is vital.

Resources





- Many more resources, including the 2020 Annual SHOT Report are available on the SHOT website www.shotuk.org
- In particular our educational resources
 - SHOT Bites
 - SHOTcasts
 - Webinars
 - Videos (Laboratory errors)
 - Email signatures







Resources

DOWNLOAD THE NEW SHOT APP

















HOME

ABOUT

PROGRAMME

ABSTRACT

EXHIBITORS

LMIC & GRANTS

REGISTER

IHN-SHOT 2022

CONNECT, SHARE AND PROMOTE TRANSFUSION SAFETY



6-8 July 2022 / Brighton, UK

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Acknowledgements

- The SHOT team
- The Steering Group and Working Expert Group members
- MHRA haemovigilance team
- The vigilant reporters and hospital staff who share their incidents
- The UK Forum for funding
- Everyone who has contributed to and supported our activities

For further information visit: www.shotuk.org

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https://www.e-arc.co.uk/about-us/





