Getting it Right from Getting it Wrong

SHOT 2011 Case Studies

The South East Coast Transfusion Practitioners & The South East Coast RTC Education Day

"The Journey of Blood" 8 November 2012

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
Key Lesson 2011

The key lesson from the Annual SHOT Report 2011 is:

'Back to Basics'



Transfusion Loop






Key Recommendations 2011

Four key recommendations underpinning back to basics:

- 1. Correct patient identification.
- 2. Education and competency.
- Knowledge of transfusion medicine and of prescribing/authorising.
- 4. Clinical and transfusion laboratory handover.



Key Recommendation 1



 Correct patient identification
should be a core clinical skill

http://www.transfusionguidelines.org/index.a spx?pageid=982§ion=27&publication

Transposed patient ID during phlebotomy leads to ABO incompatible transfusion

- Patient A, real blood group O RhD negative, was transfused 2 units of A RhD positive blood during cardiac surgery, because of wrong blood in tube (WBIT) at phlebotomy.
- On arrival in ICU he received two more group A units without apparent adverse events.
- Following transfusion, the patient showed evidence of haemolysis, with a fall in Hb requiring further transfusions, and rise in bilirubin to 241mmol/L within 6 days
- He had an extended stay in ITU.



Key Recommendation 2

- Education and competency in blood transfusion safety remains a key issue in patient safety.
- Competency assessment must be underpinned by an adequate and assessable knowledge base



Other person's access card

- A temporary member of staff removed 2 units of red cells from the refrigerator without checking the patient's identifiers or undertaking any checks on the blood component.
- The temp was asked to collect the blood by a Staff Nurse, who gave their access card to the member of staff, who was not allowed to collect blood having had no training or competency assessment.



Key Recommendation 3

 Knowledge of transfusion medicine and of prescribing/authorising

of blood components are essential core requirements for any practitioner (medical and nursing) who prescribes or authorises blood components.



Haematemesis - excessive Tx leading to TACO

- A middle-aged woman with known alcoholic liver disease presented with haematemesis and was urgently transfused 7 units of red cells without monitoring the Hb.
- The Hb on the previous day was 11.3 g/dL. The patient was not reviewed regularly during transfusion.
- Her Hb rose to 16.4 g/dL post-transfusion requiring venesection of 2 units and admission to high dependency unit (HDU) for ventilation because of pulmonary oedema.
- She later died of multi-organ failure. It was felt that death was related to the excessive transfusion.



Key Recommendation 4

Clinical and transfusion laboratory handover

templates should be improved to include information about diagnosis (particularly haemoglobinopathies), irregular antibodies and special requirements.



Failure to inform the laboratory of the diagnosis of beta-thalassaemia major

- A 33 year old woman with beta thalassaemia major was referred from another hospital.
- There was no documentation of transfusion special requirements in the referral paperwork



Checklists

- SHOT recommends the use of a transfusion checklist across the complete transfusion process to ensure correct completion of each step.
- A model template can be found on the SHOT website:

See SHOT Resources

www.shotuk.org



Failure to check that transfusion was indicated before prescribing

- A 2 month old baby on the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) required platelets prior to surgery, but the order for platelets was erroneously made twice.
- Following the first transfusion, lab staff noticed the next day that platelets were still available but due to expire at midnight, so informed the ward.
- This triggered NICU staff to get the platelets to the ward on the assumption that they were required and a junior doctor was asked to prescribe the platelets.
- The transfusion was discontinued when a senior doctor subsequently noticed that the baby was receiving platelets that were not required.



Additional key messages from the Annual SHOT Report 2011



Key message 1


- About half of the cases reported to SHOT are due to preventable mistakes.
- Similarly, most of the serious adverse events reported to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) are also attributable to human error (788/811).

Wrong sample selected results in patient receiving an ABO-incompatible transfusion

- Due to the wrong sample being selected for testing, a patient was typed as AB RhD positive and transfused 3 units of red cells.
- The patient's actual group was A RhD positive.
- The error was detected when a second group and save sample was processed at a later date.
- The patient suffered no harm.



Cumulative data from SHOT Reports (15 years 1996-2011)





Key message 2

- Laboratory errors increased slightly in 2011 to 217 compared with 205 in 2010.
- There were 7 ABO grouping errors, 4 of which occurred in emergency situations when staff may have been rushed and tempted to take short cuts.



Incorrect blood group result obtained by manual tube group

- A patient presented with multiple injuries and was initially grouped by manual tube technique as O RhD positive.
- Based on this blood group 4 units of group O RhD negative red cells, 10 group O RhD positive red cells, 4 group AB FFP, 8 group A FFP, 3 group A platelets and 2 group A cryoprecipitate pools were transfused urgently.
- The patient was later found to be group AB RhD positive.



Key message 3

- The presence of anti-D in pregnant women must be carefully interpreted.
- In 7 women anti-D was assumed to be due to prophylaxis when it was in fact immune anti-D.
- The misinterpretation meant that these pregnancies were not followed as closely as they should have been
- This resulted in 6 cases of RhD haemolytic disease of the fetus and newborn (HDFN).



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Failure to follow up a weak positive antenatal antibody screen results in lack of monitoring

- The laboratory staff were unsure whether a weak positive antibody screen was due to prophylaxis.
- Repeat samples were requested but were not received.
- As a result further anti-D Ig was issued (correctly, according to guideline), but the pregnancy was not closely monitored.
- The mother was reported to have a strong anti-C+D at delivery and the baby was born suffering from HDFN, requiring an exchange transfusion.
- The baby died three days later.



Conclusion

- About half of the cases reported to SHOT are due to Getting it Wrong.
- SHOT makes recommendations in each year's Annual SHOT Report to improve practice and help with Getting it Right.



Acknowledgements

SHOT office in Manchester



- Steering Group
- Working Expert Group
- Hospital Transfusion Committees for reporting



Thanks for listening





SHOT Symposium 2013

The next Annual SHOT Report (2012 data) will be launched in July 2013.

Wednesday 10 July 2013

Royal Society of Medicine, London

